International trade and abortive growth in Thailand and Indo-China / BEBR No. 494 by Sharma, Rajendra K., fl. 1978.

UiMiVtKSlTY Of
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AI URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
STACKS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/internationaltra494shar
Faculty Working Papers
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ABORTIVE GROWTH
IN THAILAND AND INDO-CHINA
Rajendra K. Sharma, Visiting Professor of
Economics
#494
Summary;
The purpose of this paper is to show, through two case studies,
that the transmission of growth impulses from the export sector to the
rest of the economy might be weakened by a number of factors stemming
from the initial resource endowment of the economy and the relative
elasticities of supply of these resources. The consequences might
be described as arrested or abortive growth. The case studies pertain
to two countries in Southeast Asia, Thailand and former (French)
Indo-China, covering the period of their entrance into world commerce
in the second half of the nineteenth century to the Second World War.
L(' ! :}
•T •'
:
I
.'1:
.-^ ':j)i i:i-jb...
Table of Contents
Page
Introduction 1
Part I. THAILAND
Thai Economy in 1855 3
Opening to the World Economy ^
Factors Impeding Economic Growth 8
Part II. INDO-CHINA
Introduction 18
Locational Disadvantage 18
French Colonial Policy 19
Pattern of Colonial Development 22
Factors Accounting for Abortive Growth 27
Conclusion 33

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ABORTIVE GROWTH
IN THAILAND AND INDO-CHINA*
Rajendra K. Sharma
Visiting Professor of Economics
University of Illinois
Urbana
INTRODUCTION
The classical explanation of arrested growth in backward economies
is that they are prisoners within a vicious circle of poverty and low
capacity to save and invest. This argument is based on the prenise
that at low levels of per capita income people are too poor to save and
invest much and this low rate of investment results in the low rate of
growth in total national income. Backwardness is thus explained in terms
of limitations of capital supply.
This explanation overlooks two crucial points. First, capital in-
vestment in this economy may as well come from rich investors abroad.
Second, income distribution in backward economies is very unequal, with
much of total income going to the few rich for whom capacity to save is
no constraint whatsoever. One is thus left to the problem of explaining
why a foreigner does not invest in a backward economy and why the in-
digenous elite choses to lavish its riches on conspicous consumption.
*Thls paper is a revised version of two chapters from the author's
Ph.D. dissertation entitled "Multi-National Planning and the Development
of the Lower Mekong Basin". The author is greatly indebted to Professor
Ashok Guha, Head of the Department of International Economics, School
of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India,
who guided the thesis. He is also Indebted to Professor John F. Due of
the University of Illinois, Urbana for valuable suggestions on an earlier
draft.
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A sociologist might, of course, claim that the latter phenomenon is
due to the strange cultural values of the rich in backward econcraiies and
many economists would be inclined to accept this explanation since it
relieves them of the necessity of looking for one themselves. However,
it is surely the business of the economist to see whether economic be-
havior cannot be explained by economic motives before abdicating this
function to a sociologist. We feel that the dissipation of potential
savings by the rich in underdeveloped countries as well as the lack of
extensive foreign investment are both due to a common cause, the narrow-
ness of the domestic market. The narrowness of the market is in turn
traceable not only to the low level of per capita income but to the
pattern of income distribution with it and Its lack of the middle class.
The income distribution in turn reflects the initial factor endowments
of the underdeveloped economies.
Given the significance of market stagnation as a barrier of growth,
what would be the Impact of an expanding external demand for exports?
The purpose of this paper is to show, through two case studies, that
the transmission of growth impulses from the export sector to the rest
of the economy might be weakened by a number of factors st^iming fran
the initial resource endowment of the economy and the relative elastici-
ties of supply of these resources. The consequences might be described
as arrested or abortive growth. The case studies pertain to two countries
in Southeast Asia, Thailand and former (French) Indo-China, covering the
period of their entrance into world commerce in the second half of the
nineteenth century to the Second World War.
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PART I - THAILAND
This section briefly portrays the economy of Thailand in 1855 and
the pattern of economic development that came into being following its
opening up to the world economy in that year. This is followed, in some-
what greater detail, by an analysis of the factors that accounted for
the abortive growth of Thailand, despite many favorable features of the
economy that should have led to induced economic growth.
Thai Economy in 1855
Thailand in 1855 provided the familiar features of a subsistence
economy. Thus, the working population was wholly engaged in agriculture,
with rice production covering nearly 95 percent of the cultivable land.
Population at 5 or 6 million, with a density of 25-30 per square miles,
was sparse in relation to available land resources. Each farmer pro-
duced rice sufficient to meet the requirements of his family. He had
little incentive to produce beyond his requirements since there were few,
if any, opportunities to exchange additional produce with other goods.
A study of the Thai economy before 1855 reveals that for many gen-
erations it had experienced little impulse towards change. This was due
to the fact that there were hardly any pressures that might have induced
adoption of alternatives in economic behavior or methods. It was indeed
a self-sufficient economy at all levels. There was little or no trade
between regions on account of inadequate and hence costly means of
transportation. Moreover, each region was able to produce locally to
its own requirements.
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In the decades prior to 1855, and even as far back as 1620, there
Is evidence that rice was an export product but the trade was neither
steady nor continuous. It has been estimated by James Ingram that rice
exports constituted a very low proportion of total production; the aver-
age ratio ordinarily did not exceed 2 or 3 percent. The activity of the
government was of a restrictive nature, with public expenditure primarily
intended for religious buildings and the maintenance of courts. The only
form of public works which received some attention was the digging of
canals for irrigation and as a means of transportation. It is thus clear
that, before its exposure to the outside world in 1855, the Thai economy
was "extraordinarily stable and insulated."
Opening to the World Economy
After 1855, the economy of Thailand became increasingly commercialized.
From a basically barter and subsistence economy, it steadily moved towards
greater use of trade and money exchange. This momentous change came in
the wake of political situation that was prevalent in Southeast Asia at
the time. The British appeared in Burma, while the French were pressing
in Indo-China. The opening of China made it plain to the Thai ruling
class that their isolation from the West could no longer be sustained.
Soon after his accession to the throne in 1851, King Mongkut (Rama IV)
became convinced that if Thailand was to survive as an independent nation,
According to Ingram, it varied with the weather, the state of
the market, political and military conditions and the temper of the King.
Cf. James C. Ingram, "Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Re-
sources," in C. D. Cowan (ed.). The Economic Development of Southeast
Asia (London, 1964), p. 102.
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It must be prepared to live with the West and come into closer contact
with tae world economy. He, therefore, voluntarily removed some restric-
tions on trade in the first years of his reign and later in 1855, entered
into negotiations with the British. These negotiations culminated in
the si:gning of the Browning Treaty (1855) which swept away virtually all
restrictions on exports and imports and plunged Thailand abruptly into
the international economy as a free trade nation.
This momentous change came at a time when there was a strong upsurge
in demand for rice in the world market, following major improvements in
ocean transportation and the opening of the Suez Canal. As a result, a
powerful economic force originating outside the Thai economy began to
exert its influence on the structure and production in Thailand. A regu-
lar and rising demand for rice in the world market led to more and more
specialization in one major crop—rice. The area planted in rice expanded
leading to increasing rice exports after 1855. Unused land was cleared
of jungle, canal network was extended and area under cultivation grew
2
rapidly as is evident from the following table:
TABLE I
Thailand: Area Under Cultivation
Year Area under cultivation (Million rai)*
l850 6
1905-6 y
1925-23 17
1935-36 21
1950 35
*One rai = 0.16 hectares (0.4 acres).
2
James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand since 1850 ,
California, 1954 (Stanford University Press, Stanford).
v..
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The rapid expansion of rice cultivation was made possible by the existence
of abundant land, together with established right to claim, clear and
cultivate such land. It was further facilitated by the release of a large
3
number of men from the Corvee system who readily turned to rice culti-
vation.
Although official estimates of total production of rice before 1907
are not available, such data as are available suggest a steady increase
in production and export. The available data for rice exports are sum-
marized in Table II below.
TABLE II
Thailand Rice Trade: Volume and Value, 1858-59
to 1955-59
Average volume Average value Average price
per year per year pe r picul
Period (000 piculs)^ (000 Baht) (Baht)
1857-59 990 , _
1860-64 1,840 - —
1865-69 1,630 - -
1870-74 1,870 5,110 2.70
1875-79 3,530 10,110 2.90
1880-84 3,580 9,610 2.70
1885-89 5,320 15,080 2.80
1890-94 7,250 23,780 3.30
1895-99 8,000 36,410 4.60
1900-04 11,130 61,280 5.50
1905-09 14,760 81,020 5.50
1910-14 15,220 81,230 5.30
1915-19 15,790 108,140 6.90
1920-24 17,680 115,350 6.50
1925-29 23,390 169,690 7.20
1930-34 25,720 91,240 3.50
1935-39 25,370 94,570 3.70
The "Corvee" represented a system of slavery and forced labor.
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Table II cont.
Period
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
Average volume
per year
(OOP piculs)
Average value
per year
(000 Baht)
Average price
per picul
(Baht)
13,250
11,980
22,700
21,000
99,320 7.50
994,000 (2,000,000)* 80.00 (167)*
2,385,000 (3,900,000) 105.00 (172)
2,940,000 140.00
One piculs = 60.0 kg (132.3 lb)
*Figures in parenthesis represent Baht values converted at
the open market exchange rates. Beginning in 1955, use of
an official rate for rice exports ceased, and a unitary
exchange rate was adopted.
Source: James C. Ingram, "Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of
Resources," in C. D. Cowan, The Economic Development of South-
east Asia, 1964,
The figures averaged for five-year period to smoothen the year-to-
year fluctuations show a steady increase in the physical volume of rice
exports during most of the past century. After a slow and erratic in-
crease up to 1870-74, the volume of rice exports rose to a peak of 25.7
million piculs in 1930-34. This figure marks a twenty-five fold increase
in exports over probably the maximum in 1855; the average annual volume
of exports during 1857-59 was 990,000 piculs. During the same period,
population of Thailand increased only two-fold, from 5 or 6 million in
1850 to about 7.3 million in 1900 and 11.5 million in 1929. But inspite
of an investible surplus of such a high magnitude, the Thai economy
failed to generate economic progress. It is instructive, therefore, to
analyze the factors which contributed to the abortive growth of the
Thai economy.
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Factors Impeding Economic Growth
Before going into the basic factors, one point that deserves to be
noted is the geographic location of Thailand. The only sea port of the
country (Bangkok) was far removed from the ocean highways then prevail-
ing. Thai exports had, therefore, to incur additional transport cost
for shipment to ports on the direct trade routes—Singapore and Hong Kong,
Moreover, for the relatively short distance. Thai exports could not have
access to large and cheap steamships. Consequently, shipment of rice to
the export market had to be made in low-capacity, high-cost ferries or
small ships. The price differential emanating from this additional
transport cost appears to have been responsible for Burma (with Rangoon
on the direct sea routes) pricing out Thailand rice in the world market.
A study of the destinational pattern of Thai rice reveals that bulk
of it was exported to markets in Asia as can be seen from data assembled
In Table III below.
TABLE III
Destination of Rice Exports, Selected Years
China and Other Europe and
Year Hong Kong Singapore Asia all others Total
1867 1,330 276 17 159 1,832
1875 2,420 1,140 — 360 3,920
1879 1,410 1,470 — 1,150 4,030
1887 5,130
160
1,050
1,240
6,630
1890 4,700 1,990 8,090
1900-04 (av) 5,950 4,080 53 1,030 11,130
1907/08 7,137 5,086 90 2,147 14,460(*)
1911/12 7,545 5,975 310 3,720 17,550(*)
1923/24-
1927/28 9,375 7,868 3,051 2,341 22,645(*)
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Table III cont.
Year
China and
Hong Kong Singapore
Other
Asia
Europe and
all others Total
1932/33
1939/40
1954
11,432
6,085
1,915
7,130
11,869
3,565
5.545
6,700
9,370
3,760
6,882
1,880
27,867
31,537
16,730
Note: Total for these years do not agree with other series as
sources for the two series differ.
Source: James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand (Stanford
University Press, Stanford, California, 1954).
The markets in Asia, earlier fed by Burma, were abondoned by it in favor
of more gainful markets in Europe, in the wake of the opening of the Suez
Canal. Thus the locational disadvantage of Bangkok port deprived Thailand
from taking full advantage of the major spurt in demand for rice in the
world market. It had to contend itself with residual markets in Asia,
left over by Burma. Thailand had another handicap, compared to other
major rice exporters, Burma and Indo-China. These countries were members
of an empire and had a sheltered European market, while Thailand exper-
ienced the difficulties of an independent producer in a world of prefer-
ential marketing.
In spite of this handicap, the gain to the Thai economy from the
spurt in demand for rice was momentous in that the volume of rice exports
registered a 25-fold increase over a period of about 60 years, while its
population during the same period increased by a mere 2-fold. How is it
then that this major spurt in export did not lead to induced economic
growth in Thailand?
In the first place, it is necessary to study the manner in which the
farmer responded to an externally induced demand for rice. Now, the
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response of the farming community to a spurt in demand for its product
depends on the relative elasticity of factor endowments of the country.
In Thailand, the land resource was abundant and easy to cultivate. The
land-man ratio was highly favorable so that the supply of land resource
was of an elastic nature. Given an abundant supply of land which was
cheap, easy to acquire and cultivate, the Thai farmer responded along
traditional lines through extension of cultivation to new areas. The
resort to extensive cultivation was also facilitated by: (a) low money
expenditure on cultivation, given simple tools and use of no fertilizer,
and (b) incentive given by the government for developing new areas through
tax concessions and exemptions.
The method adopted by the Thai farmer was the increase in the total
volume of resources rather than making the given volume of resources more
productive. Instead of making any revolutionary changes in his techniques
which could have led to increase in productivity, he expanded his produc-
tion through extension of cultivation using traditional methods of pro-
duction. In other words, he adopted an expansion process which kept it-
self growing by drawing upon an increasing volume of hitherto unused or
surplus resources to export production.
The above method inevitably led to the dispersal of production
centers to farther and farther areas. The dispersed nature of the pro-
duction points necessitated an efficient system of collection, milling
and transportation of the produce to the port of embarkation for the
export market. These functions are not only capital intensive but also
subject to economies of scale and could not be performed by the farmer
himself. As the production dispersed to distant areas, the role of
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middlemen to carry out the above functions became increasingly important.
The farmer in fact became heavily dependent upon the middlemen for sale
of his produce. The crucial nature of his function in the export trade
enabled the middlemen to appropriate a major proportion of the export
price.
The spurt in demand for rice and the rapid extension of area under
cultivation should have led. to an increase in the demand for farm labor
giving rise to an Increase in the wage level in the agricultural sector.
This increase in income of the labor engaged in cultivation could have
changed the consumption pattern in the rural sector and given rise to a
market for manufactured products thereby opening an important avenue for
economic growth. But this opportunity was lost in Thailand. The reasons
for this are not difficult to discern. Firstly, starting from 1850, the
Corvee system was substantially eliminated by 1905. This movement toward
personal freedom was an important accompaniment to the expansion of rice
cultivation in Thailand. The elimination of the Corvee freed a signifi-
cant amount of labor services which became available for hire or was
devoted to the land of the cultivator himself. Their entry to the labor
market swelled the ranks of farm labor and did not allow the wage level
to Increase substantially. Secondly, the size of the population in
Thailand registered an Increase and this also tended to restrict any
' sizeable increase in the farm wages.
Again, the growth of trade and commerce after 1850 led to an increase
in demand for wage labor outside agriculture. Since rice cultivation was
becoming more attractive, and since few Thais were willing to become wage
laborers, wages tended to rise. Scarcity of labor and a persistent
V . ' :>ii(;
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tendency for wages to rise were features of the Thai economy from 1850
until the 1920's.
Had the scarcity of labor been allowed to continue, it is possible
that wages might have risen enough to attract labor from agriculture.
The high wages and loss of manpower in agriculture might in turn have
induced farmers to use more capital and to improve their techniques.
Similarly, the employers of labor in trade and industry might have been
induced to develop methods of using labor sparingly. In this way, tech-
nical and organizational changes might have been drawn to other activities
in which they could have achieved efficiency. More important, a rise in
the wage level would have made the market somewhat elastic. And all
these factors could have set in motion a cumulative process.
As it turned out, however, the scarcity of labor had other conse-
quences. To meet the rising danand for wage labor, immigration of
Chinese was not only permitted but deliberately encouraged from 1850
until 1930's. As the Thais were not interested in occupations other
than rice cultivation, the demand for almost all wage labor outside of
agriculture was filled largely with Chinese immigrants. As a conse-
quence, the rise of wages did not go far enough to attract the Thais
ax^ay from agriculture.
Another factor which kept the Thais away from commerce and wage
labor was the clanishness of the Chinese immigrants. Not only did they
form secret societies but also effectively combined to prevent the entry
of an outsider into a trade, craft, line of business, or even a particu-
lar rice mill. Thus the large scale immigration of Chinese not only did
not permit the wage level to increase substantially in nonagricultural
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activities, but also prevented any substantial increase in farm wages
which in turn prevented the market to become elastic.
Another important factor for the abortive growth of the Thai economy
can be related to the pattern of income distribution that emerged from
the production and export of rice. Now, although the Thais owned the
land, all other functions connected with the export crop were in the
hands of the middlemen, mostly the Chinese. Why did a large number of
Chinese come to Thailand? The main reason is the geographical location
of Thailand, far away from ocean highways with the result that It had
to export bulk of her products to China, Thailand's was primarily a
peasant economy and the people were unfamiliar with the art of commerce.
A sudden emergence of Thai rice in the orbit of world trade created
the need for such people who were long familiar with the methods of
trading, transportation, etc. In South China, land concentration was
very high, so that for these people, good living was not to be on land
but on tiading, supplying credit, etc. &n the other hand, for the Thais,
the safe and easy method was rice cultivation. The Chinese were, there-
fore, bef^t suited to play the role of middlemen in Thailand.
The Chinese performed crucial functions and acquired undisputed
monopoly of Thai rice trade. Thus, they bought paddy from the grower,
shipped jt for sale to the miller, lended money, advanced supplies, sold
imported n^rchandise, and transported goods In both directions. The hold
that the Chinese had on the Thai economy is Indicated by the fact that by
1942-45, nearly 90 percent of all the rice mills in the country were
Chinese-owned. In fact, the Chinese middlemen practically controlled the
whole of rice crop from the moment it left the farmer's hands. Through
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these operations the Chinese were taking a large proportion of the profit
in rice trade. The overall share of export proceeds accruing to them is
difficult to estimate but it was doubtless quite substantial. The Thai
Financial Adviser, one Mr. Doll, estimated in 1937 that about 50 percent
of the export price of rice was required to be paid to the miller, the
exporter and the middlemen and that, of all the intermediaries, those
4between the grower and the miller probably enjoyed the largest share.
Given the above situation, the Thai farmer did not get his due share
of the export price. He received only a small proportion which, after
taking into account the cost of cultivation, left him more or less on a
subsistence level of living. The Thai farmer had little money to invest
for making permanent improvement in his land or for buying inputs for
his annual production. For these he depended on the Chinese money lender,
who charged exorbitant rates of interest. After meeting the tost of cul-
tivation and fulfilling his obligations to the money lender, the Thai
farmer was left with little or no resources. As a result he was too poor
to live beyond subsistence level and his demand was limited to foodgrains,
simple clothing and minimum of shelter. He had no funds to spare for
any other products and could not provide a market for any manufactured
products.
The Chinese appropriated bulk of the proceeds from the export trade.
Most of the investible funds were concentrated in their hands and they
constituted a prosperous community. However, they also did not constitute
a market of any substantial size. Firstly, though prosperous, they were
4
Cf. James C. Ingram, op. clt
.
, n. 1, p. 72,
<.« i
-15-
used to a frugal standard of living. Secondly, the number of Chinese
(and other foreigners) who controlled the various functions related to
the export crop was relatively small. Their consumption pattern was
such that It did not constitute effective demand for many manufactured
products. Their demand was too small and for a variety of commodities
which could best be met through imports.
Moreover, Thailand was isolated from the Western influence, being
the only free country in Asia. It was under the zone of Chinese influ-
ence whose own standard of living was no better than the Thais. This
meant that there was little or no beneficial Impact on the "demonstration
effect" of Western consumption on the size of market in Thailand. As a
result, the demand for large manufactured products was more or less non-
existent. That manufacturing activity was insignificant is evident
from the fact that only 2.2 percent of the labor force was engaged in
manufacture.
Another factor to be noted is that Thailand's was an open economy,
with little or no tariffs on imports; the country was treaty bound not
to levy import duty exceeding 3 percent which permitted almost free entry
of imports. This situation implied that domestic producers were by and
large at a disadvantage to foreign producers based on large markets of
advanced countries.
In spite of a narrow and inelastic market in general, there were
two commodities which were consumed by bulk of the population and were im-
ported in large quantity, namely, cotton textiles and sugar. What ac-
counted for the non-development of local industry and continued dependence
on imports for these products? For textile industry, it is well known
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that the cost of distribution should not be very high. In Thailand no
textile industry was set up because the cost of textiles would have gone
up on account of high transport cost particularly because no railroad
network was available. As stated earlier, in Thailand land was abundant,
almost free. As price of land went up, area under cultivation was grad-
ually extended. Ast a consequence, the market was dispersed and carried
away further afield. The cost of distribution was thus being raised by
dispersion of the niarket.
The case of sugar imports makes an interesting study. In 1860, Thai
sugar industry was able not only to meet the entire domestic requirements,
but also export a {substantial quantity abroad. The industry, however,
collapsed in 1870 iiaking it necessary for Thailand to import sugar. This
abrupt change was brought about by: (1) low price at which Japanese and
Philippines sugar was available; (ii) the unprotected Thai market; and
(ill) the "chaotic" tax structure faced by the local industry. Although
tax structure was fairly harsh. It was primarily the very low price of
sugar which led the Thai farmer to shift from sugar to rice cultivation.
The process of subsititution was greatly facilitated by a rise in the price
of rice in the international market at a time when world sugar prices had
registered a downward movement.
An Important esxception to the above thesis was the tin mining in-
dustry. The development of this industry in Thailand was analogous to the
The decline of the infant sugar industry in Thailand was prob-
ably closely connected with the subsidized development of beet sugar on
the European continent which caused such a remarkable fall in the world
sugar prices.
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extractive export Industries in other countries where such a development
had important impact on the growth of the producing country. How is it
then that tin mining in Thailand did not provide the "engine of growth"?
The reasons are not difficult to discern. Thai tin industry shares
with some other underdeveloped countries the characteristics of being
more clost.ly integrated with the foreign market than with the rest of
the Thai economy. Indeed, in the case of Thailand the separation of tin
mining has: been even more complete than in other countries where at
least the bulk of the labor force is usually provided by the dominant
ethnic conmunity. Here, in Thailand, the Chinese labor force dominated
the tin industry and represented until recently a truly non-competing
force.
In addition to the above, the technological and locational character-
istics of the tin mining industry did not permit it to become a leading
sector. Firstly, the major uses of tin are as an alloy and the value of
tin in reJ.ation to volume is high. As a result, the economics of tin use
in manufac;turing favors location based on the cost structure of the pri-
mary metaJ. instead of the geographical tin sources. With most of the
weight lojis taking place during concentration and melting, it is the dis-
tribution of the market which governs the location of succeeding stages
of metal fabrication. As a consequence, the resource does not induce
location of any substantive amount of linked activities. Secondly, most
of the tin mining in Thailand is located near the peninsula coast. The
location of the industry near the cost prevented it from having any
important growth inducing effects via associated facilities such as
railroad network.
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PART II - FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Introduction
Indo-China, to use the picturesque Chinese description, is a pole
balanced by two baskets of rice; the pole being the Annamite mountain
range which parallels the coast and the ri -e baskets being the two great
deltas cf the Mekong and Red rivers. It formed part of the region known
as the "rice granary of the orient" and possessed valuable natural re-
sources. Her coal resources, chiefly of high grade anthracite, had been
estimated to total twenty billion tons. The region had large substantial
tin deposits in Tonkin and Laos, and smaller amounts of iron ore, tungsten,
manganese, antimony, zinc and lead. Agricultural raw materials included
rubber, cotton, silk, vegetable oils and fibers, timber and a variety of
other products.
It is well known that Indo-China was one of the most intensively
exploited colonial areas in the world. But inspite of this and despite
its riot natural resources, the great majority of Indo-Chinese population
of some 23 million remained in a state of extreme poverty, dependents for
their meager livelihood on rice growing and handicraft industries. This
section seeks to analyze the factors which accounted for the abortive
growth cf Indo-China during the period of French occupation.
Locational Disadvantage
At the outset, it is necessary to highlight the locational dis-
advantage of Indo-China. The Indo-Chinese peninsula appears to be
admirably located for great maritime activity. It is near Thailand,
Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines and the numerous smaller islands of
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the Pacific. But, In reality, Indo-China was outside the then trade
currents of Asia. This was because in the peninsula there was no inter-
national port comparable to Singapore and Hong Kong. As a result, ves-
sels idiich passed through the corridor dividing Sumatra from Malacca
touched at Singapore and thereafter went directly to Hong Kong, without
touching at Saigon. The location of Indo-China ports, far away from the
main trade routes then prevailing, meant additional transport cost for
her export products, both in loading and unloading at, and the haulage
cost to, a port on the main trade routes—Singapore or Hong Kong.
French Colonial Policy
An important factor which contributed to the abortive growth of
Indo-China was the policy the French Government adopted towards the
peninsula. In keeping with traditional French colonial policy, Indo-
China was developed strictly as an appendage to the economy of the mother
country. It was indeed an axiota of French col,onial administration that
a colony should confine itself to the production of raw materials and
to the purchase of manufactured products from the metropolitan country.
As Robequain aptly noted:
"It has not been given to any colony to develop its
industries freely; even the possibility of such
development has always seemed paradoxical, almost ,
inconceivable; Indo-China has not escaped this law."
Why did the French insist on adopting this policy? To understand
this it is necessary to study the world economic situation then prevailing.
Charles A. Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indo-
China, Oxford University Press, 1944.
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Firstly, in 1870*8, when French control of Indo-China became effective,
economic thinking in France had undergone radical transformation at the
time. This was the moment when French heavy industry was getting a
healthy head start. At the same time, colonial intervention was becom-
ing increasingly common. French industrialists were worried; they feared
over production and were looking for new markets. A close tariff union
binding the colonies to the mother country seemed to offer a hopeful
solution to the problem.
The trend toward protectionism was reinforced by the unpopularity
of the colonial campaigns. Prominent businessmen demanded that the
colonies should be reserved as an exclusive French market. Meline,
Director of the Association of French Industry and Agriculture, declared
that "within a sound colonial system, colonial production must be limited
to supplying the mother country with raw materials or non-competititive
products." He warned that "if colonial production were to step out of
this field and offer competition to their own production, it would be-
come a dangerous opponent." He went to the extent of proposing that
French Parliament should establish colonial compensation licences which
would be required of any industry set up in the colonies to compete with
a similar industry in France.
Secondly, when the Indo-Chinese Union was established, European
markets were becoming satiated while the United States and Germany were
developing along protectionist lines. It was natural for France to go
into a scheme of economic self-sufficiency, dependent upon her overseas
possessions for raw materials as well as for marketing her manufactured
products. France, however, faced a major problem regarding such a
'iiliU .
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colonlal relationship as far as Indo-Chlna was concerned. Indo-China
was mainly a country of one culture—rice—which was not consumed exten-
sively in France. And when significant quantitltes of Indo-Chinese rice
started entering the French market, local wheat growers stood firmly
against it.
In order, therefore, to obtain satisfactory trade, it became neces-
sary for the French to lay emphasis upon production of diversified com-
modities and cultures, for example, coal, tea, coffee, silk, rubber and
maize. Decreasing population in France at the time made it difficult
for Frenchmen to migrate in large numbers to the colony. The French felt,
however, that there was no need to have a surplus population in order to
colonize. They believed that an excess of capital would serve the same
end. Colonization under this concept meant "spheres of influence and
markets held to the mother-land by tariffs."
But the attainment of this objective depended upon the utilization
of capital which would counteract the dearth of French colonists. In
short, the Franc would bring into existence what the Frenchmen could not
undertake. The attempt made to institute a system comparable to that of
Belgian Congo, whereby foreign capitalists invest in commercial and in-
dustrial enterprise, was not successful in Indo-China because French
capital was not attracted to the colonies. The cautious French investor
preferred to purchase South African, Central American and Japanese bonds,
instead of helping his compatriates in Indo-China. The French entre-
preneurs in Indo-China were anxious to compensate for home indifference
by enlisting financial aid of outside interests, especially American, to
whom they offered direct trade and attractive tariff. But the French
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Goveriment was chary of foreign Influence in the peninsula and failed to
provide suitable regulation for the entrance of non-French capitalists.
In spite of these limitations, certain sectors of the colonial economy
were developed, the details of which are set out In the next section.
Pattern of Colonial Development
The pattern of economic development that unfolded in Indo-Chlna was
entirely In keeping with the French colonial policy outlined above. Thus,
emphasis was laid on the development of such products which could neatly
fit in the metropolitan economy, that is, the plantation crops and
minerals to feed the French Industry. The development of agriculture
was also oriented primarily to suit the requirements of the mother
country. A brief survey of the major fields of economic activity is out-
lined below:
(1) Plantations
Among the plantation crops, the development of rubber was claimed
as the French planters' greatest success in Indo-China. This was made
possible by a number of factors:
(a) The soil and climate in the colony was particularly
suited to rubber plantation;
(b) The French planter, starting rather late, benefitted
continually from the experiments of large neighboring
producers in British Malaya and Netherlands Indies; and
(c) Since Indo-China was the only French colony where rubber
cultivation was developed without exceeding mother
country's demand, its development fitted neatly Into
the framework of the imperial economy.
As a result, production of rubber Increased significantly from 298 tons
in 1915 to 3,159 tons In 1919, 10,319 tons in 1929 and as high as 60,000
tons in 1938,
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The other plantation crop where the French invested was coffee.
On the wholti, progress was very slow since total production from approx-
imately 13,(100 hectres was estimated at only 1,500 tons in 1937-38
session. This is remarkably low considering the half century of effort
behind it. This may be attributed to:
(a) cJimatic factor; the blossoms were sometimes washed off
bj' heavy rains, summer droughts or, in region near the
sea, by typhoons;
(b) non-avaliability of fertilizer; the area under cultiva-
t:.on was limited by the number of cattle which would be
mseded to get animal manure. The size and quality of
the pastures was often very low.
Tea and pepper were the other plantation crops which received the
attention of the colonizers. But their progress was not marked with
any significant results. The most important reason for this was that
both capita!, and experience were lacking for the organization of these
plantations on a scale large enough to be profitable. In fact, planters
of these crops were using primitive methods which gave rise to low pro-
ductivity and made these uneconomical.
(11) Minerals
The extraction of anthracite coal, for which the peninsula had
enormous resjources, was by far the leading mining activity in Indo-China.
Total production increased from 501,000 tons in 1913 to a record figure
of 2,308,000 tons In 1937-38. The value of coal production to the total
mining production in Indo-China varied from 89 percent in 1932 to 63
percent in 1937.
Among ihe metals, zinc and tin were far ahead of all others both in
value and In continuity of extraction. Production was, however, not
steady and varied according to the export market which in turn was
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dependent on the world price of ore, freight rates, goveriment support
in the form of tariff protection or bounties, and on currency fluctua-
tions. Statistics indicate that 1916 and 1926 were peak years, separated
by deep depression which reached its lowest level in 1920 when Japanese
metal industry ran in difficulties resulting from the loss of its Russian
market after the Revolution. Zinc ore production dropped from 61,900
tons in 1926 to 10,600 tons in 1937.
Other useful minerals were only of c inor significance in the total
mineral production. These included wolfram, antimony, iron ore, manganese
ore, gold, graphite, phosphate and precious stones. Although all these
figured in the trade of Indo-China their contribution to total export
earnings was by no means significant.
(ili) Agriculture
Rice cultivation has traditionally constituted the chief economic
activity and the greatest source of wealth in Indo-China. Before the
occupation of the peninsula by the French the Annamite Government, in
oriental fashion, prohibited its exportation on the ground that by so
doing a low price level would be maintained! This resulted in the
farmers producing only enough for local consumption. As soon as the
French administration became established, the export of rice was
authorized. Swarms of Chinese entered the region where rice was grown,
took control of its processing, trade and transport and shipped great
quantities to China, the Philippines and India. The local farmers
followed the example of the Chinese; in this they received increasing
support from French investment and enterprise. As a result, acreage
under rice cultivation and exports of rice increased quite significantly.
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Rice In fact became the backbone of the country's economy, both as a
staple food and the principal source of revenue, accounting for 40-45
percent of the total revenue of the export trade. The following table
shows the relationship between the extension of the cultivated area,
the Increase in rice exports and the country's population:
TABLE IV
Increase in Areas Planted to Rice, Rice Exports
and Population in Cochin China
Increase 1880
1880 1900 1937 to 1937 (%)
Area, cultivated
(in hectres) 522,000 1,175,000 2,200,000 421
Rice exports from
Saigon (in tons) 284,000 747,000 1,584,000 545
Population of
Cochin China 1,679,000 2,937,000 4,484,000 267
Source: Charles A. Robequaln, The Economic Development of French
Indo-China
,
Oxford University Press, 1944, Table 17, p. 220.
Before the advent of the French, rice cultivation in Indo-China
was being carried out by small-holders, each cultivating his land with
bulk of the production meant for family consumption. With the arrival
of the French, the pattern of land-ownership underwent significant
change. In the northern deltas, although the increase in population
decreased the average size of landholdings , it did not affect all owners
evenly. The new trade possibilities opened up by improvement in means
of transportation and abundance of credit encouraged large estates. In
Tonkin, large estates came into existence since the French occupation
forced many farmers to become tenant farmers. According to a tentative
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study reported by Robequaln, In the Tonkin delta 61.6 percent of the
landowners had less than one mau (.36 hectares) of land and another 30
percent had from one to five mau . The number of farmers without land
or with less than five Sao (.18 hectares) was estimated by Gouron at
63 percent. These large estates were formed through the purchase of
land which was forfeited from cultivators or on which loans at exorbi-
tant Interest rates had been made.
In Cochin China, large estates occupied an even more important
position than in the northern deltas. The main factor responsible for
this concentration of land ownership was the rapid extension of rice
growing to vast regions which had previously been wastelands and were
made cultivable by canal construction. In this region. Western tech-
niques used on virgin soil with assured water supply produced quicker
and more impressive results.
Again, in the Western provinces, land ownership was highly concen-
trated. Here the new lands were not brought into cultivation by small-
scale native colonists. Since the construction of canals was expensive,
the French sold the land to the highest bidders. As a result, it was
not unusual in this region to own 500 or even 1,000 hectares of land.
On this land, which was uninhabited, cultivation was by tenant farmer
( ta diem ) who paid a specified amount of paddy as rent each year. Often
unstable and restless these farmers, lacking funds, borrowed both money
and rice from the landlord who depended as much, if not more, on the
interest from these loans as on the steady improvement of their. rice
fields. Usually, they lived far away from their land and often their
-If
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contact with the ta diem was made only through their managers (Cai).
As Robequain pointed out, land ownership here was mainly speculative.
Apart from rice cultivation, a variety of other crops were raised.
Area occupied by chief crops up to the end of 1930 was as under:
TABLE V
Indo-China, Area Under Chief Crops, 1930
Crop Total Area (in hectares)
Rice 2,213,896
Rubber 84,000
Arecanut 26,988
Coconut 18,477 '
Sugarcane 10,839
Maize 10,908
Tobacco 2,702
Groundnuts 1,390
Coffee 658
Pepper 388
Tea 150
One of the more important products was the development of silk.
Sericulture was first introducted in the peninsula by the Chinese in the
tenth century A.D. But before the advent of the French, the raising of
cacoons was undertaken in a haphazard manner by the farmers. The French,
knowing that raw silk was needed at home applied latest techniques for
its development and gave full administrative support to its encour^ement.
This made it possible to export large quantities of raw silk to feed the
the local industry in France.
Factors Accounting for Abortive Growth
A close study of the pattern of economic development, under the
auspices of French colonial policy, provides a clue to the abortive
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growth of Indo-Chlna. It Is evident from the analysis presented on
pages 22-27 that the bulk of the economic activity In Indo-China was
concentrated in a few sectors, namely the plantation crops, exploitation
of minerals and rice cultivation. The first two sectors were developed
primarily for export markets in France and elsewhere. Now, the extent
to which the export sector induces the development of other sectors of
the economy depends upon the technological nature of the production
function of the export commodity. In the plantation crop, the produc-
tion function was such that the most efficient organization for any
level of production was on a relatively labor-intensive basis. In other
words, the commodity technologically required a relatively large number
of laborers to perform comparatively simple tasks.
Moreover, there were significant increasing returns to scale in the
cultivation and processing of the commodity. Consequently, comparatively
large amounts of capital and labor were necessary for the most efficient
size of the production unit. A high level of managerial and technical
skill was also needed to direct large plantations effectively. In view
of these requirements, people who owned the plantations were from higher
income groups who possessed the funds or could borrow them in the capital
market. And, in order to produce the commodity at the lowest possible
costs, they created demand for the unskilled labor of a very low income
group.
The above conditions did not give rise to induced economic growth
in other sectors of the economy. The reasons for this can be studied
from both demand and -supply forces. First, in order to introduce domestic
production of commodities for which an export market did not exist, there
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must be Internal demand for such products. This, a plantation economy
based on export markets, did not provide. In the plantation economy one
end of the scale was composed of a large number of unskilled labor with
low income packets. Most of this group's effective demand consisted
of a few basic foods, simple clothing and minimum shelter needs. They
could not, therefore, provide a market for any manufactured products.
The effective demand for the higher class of consumer goods and
_
services stemmed largely from the middle and high income groups who
were composed of large plantation owners, those performing the marketing
services associated with the, export crop and, to some extent, the small
planters/producers. Their consumption pattern was such that it did not
constitute effective demand for any manufactured products. This is
because the foreigners and other rich, who earned a sizeable proportion
of the national income, were few in number and did not constitute mass
market for a single product; their demand was for a large number of
commodities.
Moreover, even the small market available was of an inelastic nature.
It could not be enlarged by small fluctuation in price; a small fall in
price could not make it accessible to any large number of people. In an
open economy, this situation implied that domestic producers were by and
large at a disadvantage to foreign producers based on large markets of
advanced countries. Hence, local production of manufactured products
was not possible, except for a few light consumer goods.
From the supply side also, one reaches the same conclusion. Here,
the familiar theory is that of the vicious circle; the people are too
poor to save and invest. But this does not explain the true picture.
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As we have seen, in Indo-Chlna there were some sections of the community
who had incomes far above the subsistence level and yet did not invest
in local industry.
The reason for this was that outside the export sector, there was
no incentive to invest. To understand this it is necessary to see what
the rich actually did with their surplus income. There was a tendency
on the part of well-to-do classes to spend surplus income on luxury
items, like jewelry, clothing, furniture, cars and so on. The surplus
funds also went in hoards of currency and foreign exchange, in land and
buildings and, finally, in lending at high rates for consumption purposes.
All other uses of money should have given high rates of return before
they could attract investment. By lending, the investors got high re-
turn on their capital and consequently they had not incentive to invest
elsewhere. Again, since capital was available at high rates of interest
even those who wanted to take the risk in new fields did not come forward;
lure of high return kept the investible funds blocked in money lending
business.
In the case of minerals also, the production function was more or
less of the same type as that of the plantation economy. The exploitation
of mines, as for a plantation crop, required a small group of owners and
managers, on one end of the scale, while on the other side was a large
group of unskilled laborers getting low wages and living on a subsistence
level. Both these groups did not constitute any market for manufactured
products for the same demand and supply forces as explained in detail for
the plantation economy.

-31-
The most Important sector of the Indo-Chinese economy was related
to the production and export of rice. In spite of certain handicaps,
rice acreage, production and export in Indo-China were marked with sig-
nificant increase. In Cochin China alone, for which full data are
available, over a period of 57 years (1880-1937) area under rice culti-
vation increased by 421 percent, and rice exports by 545 percent. During
the same period, the population of Cochin China increased by only 267
percent. (For details, see Table IV). This indicates that the cultiva-
tion of rice generated surplus income in the region. How is it then
that the population in the farming sector did not give rise to the demand
for manufactured and other products which could lead to induced economic
growth?
To understand this question, it is necessary to ascertain to whom
the surplus income accrued. In Indo-China, before the advent of the
French, land ownership was of a family type, each holding of a size
sufficient to meet the family requirements. After the arrival of the
French, an entirely different system of land ownership came into being.
Given the prospect of export, rice cultivation was extended to areas
not hitherto cultivated. The French invested in the development of
land and in the construction of canals. The lands thus developed were
sold to the highest bidders. These were rich landlords who cultivated
the land with the help of tenant farmers. In other areas, the farmers
who owned land were under heavy debt and were under the control of money-
lenders. Many sold their lands to get out of their clutches, while land
of others was confiscated by the money lenders.
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Land ovmership was thus largely In the hands of the few rich who
enjoyed a luxurious life in the provincial town. Cultivation was done
under the supervision of a manager ( Cai ) by a mass of fanning community,
largely the tenant farmers (ta diem ). Given the structure of land owner-
ship which was highly concentrated, bulk of the income earned was appro-
priated by the few, rich landlords. Their demand was for luxurious
products; they tended to imitate the consumption habits of the alien
rulers and met most of the requirements through imports. Apart from
this, they spent money in residential buildings, jewelry and such other
sterile investment. Most of them were money lenders and lent at high
rates of interest. Others invested in stockpiling of rice and other
mass consumption products and indulged in speculation, to the misery of
the _ta diem . Since the rate of return on these activities was high,
they had no incentive to invest in other fields.
The tenant farmers were too poor to live beyond subsistence levels
and their donand was limited to foodgrains, simple clothing and minimum
of shelter. They had no funds to spare for any other products. As a
result, neither the few rich landlords, nor the large mass of farming
community constituted a market for manufactured products.
The Chinese, who performed the function of the middlemen and con-
trolled the transport and marketing of the export products, also did
not add to the size of the market. Their standard of living was not
much higher than the natives. This gave them access to large savings
but this did not find outlet to the industrial field. A good proportion
of it was externalized to China and the balance used for lending at
high interest rates to the cultivators. By doing so they not only
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earned a high rate of return on their savings, but also exercised ef-
fective control on the production and marketing of rice.
CONCLUSION
In the two case studies, we have shown how the narrow and inelastic
nature of the market did not permit transmission of growth impulses from
the export sector to other parts of these economies. The study on
Thailand reveals that, following a spurt of demand for rice in the world
market, the agricultural economy generated investible surplus which was
sufficient to finance a rapid growth in income comparable to that discern-
ible in other countries with high saving ratio. However, up to the end
of World War II, Thailand remained a backward economy. The main factor
to which the abortive growth of Thailand may be attributed is the small
and inelastic structure of the Thai market. This market stagnation, in
turn, is traceable not only to the low level of per capita income but
to the pattern of income distribution and its lack of the middle class.
The income distribution, in turn, is attributable to the abundant and
elastic land resource endowment in Thailand.
The study of the colonial economy of French Indo-China brings out
a number of interesting points. It spells out the genesis of the French
economic policy towards its colonies and explains how Indo-China was
developed strictly as an appendage to the economy of metropolitan France.
The colonial pattern of development was primarily devoted to plantation
crops and mining. The technical nature of the production function in
both these (economic) activities required, on one end of the scale, a
small number of planters/mine owners and on the other a large number of
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unskllled laborers. This led to a pattern of income distribution which
was highly skewed and perpetuated the stagnant nature of the market.
In the development and export of rice too the same pattern of income
distribution emerged between the landlords (most of whom combined the
functions of money lenders) and the large mass of farming community.
Moreover, Indo-China had very little impact of the demonstration effect
of the consumption behavior of the Western world since very few French-
men came to live here. And the large influx of Chinese and a gradual
increase of population prevented the rise in wage levels following ex-
pansion of export activity. As a result, despite its rich mineral re-
sources, favorable land-man ratio, and a regular excess of exports over
imports, the growth of the Indo-Chinese colony remained abortive.
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